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TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE?
Vertical and horizontal dimensions of
Europeanized political communication
Ruud Koopmans and Jessica Erbe
In this paper we address the alleged communication or public sphere deficit of the EU. We
develop a systematic approach to the Europeanization of public spheres, which distinguishes
three forms of Europeanized political communication: supranational, vertical and horizontal. We
propose that the spatial reach and boundaries of public communication can be determined by
investigating communicative flows and assessing the relative density of public communication
within and between different geopolitical spaces. We apply this model to data on political claim
making in seven issue fields in German print media in the year 2000. We find that the degree and
forms of Europeanization of political communication vary considerably among policy fields.
These differences are strongly linked to the extent and type (supranational or intergovernmental)
of competencies of the EU in these fields. Contrary to the hypothesis of a public sphere deficit,
the German mass media seem to quite accurately reflect the Europeanization of policy making,
at least in those policy fields where a clear-cut transfer of competencies to the supranational EU
level has taken place.
While policy decisions in Europe are increasingly taken in the supranational and
intergovernmental arenas, the nation-state has remained the primary focus for collective
identities, and public debates and citizens’ participation in the policy process still seem
mainly situated at the nation-state level and directed at national authorities. This
discrepancy between Europe’s institutional development, its increasing competences and
influence on Europeans’ way of life, on the one hand, and the continuing predominance
of the national political space as the arena for public debates and the source for collective
identification and notions of citizenship, on the other, is at the core of Europe’s
‘democratic deficit’. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the former ‘permissive consensus’
on EU integration has eroded, increasingly after the Treaty on European Union of 1992,
which was ratified only with great difficulty in those countries where it was subject to
popular referenda. Trust in European institutions and support for the integration process
have steadily declined, and so has voter participation in European elections in many
countries (Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999). In addition, tendencies towards a ‘re-nationaliza-
tion’ of politics are observable, for example in the form of increasing support for
xenophobic parties that usually also have a strong anti-European profile.
The increasingly controversial nature of the integration process, the need to
fundamentally reshape the EU’s institutional structure and decision-making process in the
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98 RUUD KOOPMANS and JESSICA ERBE
context of enlargement, as well as the heightened visibility of Europe in people’s
everyday life (e.g. the euro), make further advances in the integration process increasingly
dependent on active engagement, acceptance, and legitimacy among the citizenry. Even
more than at the national level, the communication flow between Europe and the public
depends on the mass media. The mass media fulfil at least four crucial functions in the
European policy process. First, in the absence of direct communicative links, European
actors, issues, and policies have to be made visible by the mass media, and it is in this
public forum that they may gain (or fail to obtain) public resonance and legitimacy (the
legitimization function). Second, with the partial exception of opinion polling—which
provides only punctual, pre-structured, and non-discursive access to public opinion—Eu-
ropean policy makers must depend on the communicative channels of the mass media
(the responsiveness function) for information about the desires and concerns of the
citizenry. Third, and conversely, the public can build its opinion about the distant
European institutions and the complexities of multi-level policies only to a very small
extent on direct personal experience and therefore must also rely on how Europe
becomes visible in the mass media (the accountability function). Finally, participation of
citizens in the European policy process usually also requires access to the mass media.
Although a small number of resourceful and well-organized actors may gain access to
European policy makers directly (e.g. in the context of the Brussels lobbying circuit), most
forms of citizen participation through NGOs, civic initiatives, and social movements can
influence policy makers only by way of the visibility, resonance, and legitimacy they may
mobilize in the mass media (the participation function).
Given the growing dependence of advances in the integration process on the
emergence of a European public sphere that can fulfil these functions, it is no surprise
that the conditions for the emergence of a European public sphere have come to the fore
in the social-scientific debate about European integration (e.g. Gerhards, 1993; Erbring,
1995; Schlesinger, 1995; Kopper, 1997). However, so far this discussion suffers from
insufficient empirical grounding, and has a tendency to remain highly speculative. In this
paper, we want to offer a more empirically grounded view on the extent and forms of
Europeanization of public spheres. We do so by presenting theoretical ideas and data
from the ongoing project ‘The transformation of political mobilisation and communi-
cation in European public spheres’ (EUROPUB.COM).2 Although this project is comparative
both across time and across a total of seven countries (Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, the UK, and Switzerland), we draw here only on the German case and the
year 2000.
We focus on only one—albeit the most central—of the multiple data sources
produced in the context of the project, namely the analysis of public political claims. We
take acts of political communication—claims—as our units of analysis and use newspa-
pers as a source for the publicly visible part of this claim making. A claim is defined as
an instance of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of the expression of a
political opinion through some form of physical or verbal action, regardless of the form
this expression takes (statement, violence, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.) and
regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGOs, individuals,
etc.). Statements by journalists may also be included if the journalist’s opinion is provided
in an explicit way in the news coverage. Our approach therefore does not focus on public
opinion at the individual level in relation to the perceptions and identities of European



































































TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? 99
political mobilization as they become visible in the mass media (i.e. publicized opinion).
We acknowledge that there are other fora, beside the mass media, where Europeanized
political communication and mobilization may occur, for example in inter-organizational
or interpersonal networks that cross national boundaries. However, ultimately the rel-
evance of these networks will depend on the degree to which the incipient
Europeanization tendencies that emerge within them are able to penetrate the mass
media and are thereby able to reach a wider audience.
Because of the obvious possibility that levels of Europeanization of public com-
munication depend on the actual competencies of the EU, our analysis stretches over
various policy fields, ranging from those with strong (monetary politics, agriculture),
intermediate (immigration, military troop deployment), and weak (education, pensions)
EU influence. In addition, we study the public debate about the meta-issue of the
European integration process.
Europeanization of Public Spheres: a Theoretical Model
There has been a tendency in the literature to view the notion of a European public
sphere in a narrow way, implicitly or explicitly derived from an ideal-typical conception of
the national public sphere. Several authors have focused on the probability of the
emergence of transnational mass media or transnational collective action at the European
level. This way of approaching the problem usually results in a negative answer to the
possibility of a European public sphere, and emphasizes linguistic and cultural boundaries
as an insurmountable barrier to the Europeanization of public debates, collective identi-
ties, and collective action. Although some authors reckon with the emergence of English
as a true lingua franca in Europe that would allow direct transnational communication on
a mass level (de Swaan, 1993), for the moment this prospect seems to be very distant, not
least because of strong resistance against such cultural homogenization in many non-
English-speaking member states. In our view, this perspective on the Europeanization of
the public sphere is deficient because it views Europeanization as a replication, at a
higher level of spatial aggregation, of the type of unified public sphere that we know—or
think we know—from the nation-state context. This perspective often presupposes a
degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity and political centralization that cannot be
found in many well-functioning democratic nation-states. For instance, the Dutch conso-
ciational democracy has proved to be a successful way to politically integrate a
population characterized by deep socio-cultural cleavages (Lijphart, 1968). Similarly,
Switzerland is one of the most stable and successful Western democracies despite
important cultural differences, not least the existence of four different language regions
(Ernst, 1998).
If one looks for a genuinely transnational European public sphere, there is not much
to be found (see also Schlesinger, 1999). There have been a few attempts to establish
European-wide mass media, but most of these have either quickly disappeared (such as
the newspaper The European) or lead a marginal (and often heavily EU-subsidized)
existence (e.g. the Euronews television station or the independent, but in terms of expert
readership limited, European Voice). In so far as transnational media have been able to
carve out a niche in the media landscape, the successful examples have a global, rather
than European, profile and audience (e.g. CNN, BBC World, International Herald Tribune, Le



































































100 RUUD KOOPMANS and JESSICA ERBE
Imig and Tarrow (2001) have similarly shown that mobilization at the European level by
transnationally organized European actors is still a rare phenomenon.
Gerhards (1993, 2000) has rightly emphasized that the more realistic scenario is not
that of a genuinely supranational European public sphere in the singular, but the
Europeanization of the various national public spheres. This view assumes that—also
because of the language factor—nationally-based mass media are there to stay, but that
their content may become less focused on the nation-state context and will increasingly
include a European perspective. Gerhards (2000, p. 293) mentions two criteria for such a
Europeanization of national public spheres: on the one hand, an increased proportion of
coverage of European themes and actors, and, on the other, the evaluation of these
themes and actors from a perspective that extends beyond their one country and its
interests. Using media content data drawn from Kepplinger (1998), he shows that in
Germany between 1951 and 1995 there has hardly been an increase in European themes
and only a very slight increase—at a very low level—in the coverage of European actors.
These data, however, were gathered for other purposes and it is therefore questionable
whether they accurately measure the European dimension of themes and actors, let alone
the intricacies of multi-level politics that may result in varying mixtures of national and
European dimensions in news coverage. These methodological reservations notwith-
standing, we agree with Gerhards that an increased presence of European actors and
themes in national media would be an important criterion for the Europeanization of
public spheres. However, Gerhards’ second criterion seems unnecessarily restrictive in
that it demands an orientation on a European common good in order for an act of public
communication to qualify as ‘Europeanized’ (for this criticism see also Trenz, 2000). If we
apply this common-good criterion of orientation on more than self-interest, we should
also exclude much of the routine national claim making (e.g. of many socio-economic
interest groups) from the national public sphere.
Even though Europeanization in Gerhards’ view does not require supranational
mass media, it does presuppose a form of Europeanization of policies and politics along
lines similar to those in the traditional nation-state. It is no surprise, therefore, that
Gerhards (2000) arrives at the conclusion that the European public sphere deficit is a
direct consequence of the democratic deficit, which he sees in the lack of the kind of
government–opposition dynamics, and the direct accountability of office holders to the
electorate that we know from the national level. This position has been criticized by Eder
et al. (2000) as too restrictive. They assume that because of the complex nature of
multi-level politics, we will not necessarily find a strong orientation of public communi-
cation to European institutions. In their view, the Europeanization of policies and
regulations may instead lead to a parallelization of national public spheres in the sense
that, increasingly, the same themes are discussed at the same time under similar criteria
of relevance. An example would be the debates on asylum policies in different European
countries during the 1990s, following European-level discussions and the Dublin Agree-
ment. National political actors carried the ideas developed here into their national public
spheres, and as a result discussions were launched more or less simultaneously in several
member states about establishing lists of ‘safe third countries’, a notion that was
developed in Dublin. However, the fact that such policies had a European-level origin was
hardly mentioned in the coverage of these debates at the national level. Although what
we see in such cases is certainly a consequence of the Europeanization of policy making,



































































TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? 101
European dimension remains hidden from public view, one cannot call such debates
‘Europeanized’. For the citizen, unaware of what was discussed in Dublin or of the similar
discussions in other member states, these appear to be purely national debates. If
anything, such examples illustrate the nature of the public sphere deficit rather than a
solution to it.
Nonetheless, Eder et al. are on the right track in insisting that direct references to
the EU are not a necessary precondition for a Europeanization of public spheres. What
Gerhards’ perspective misses is that although, particularly in the first pillar, the EU has
some supranational features, many of its policies have an intergovernmental basis. These
intergovernmental features of the EU polity are more likely to be expressed in an
alternative form of Europeanization of public spheres, which has thus far received almost
no attention in the literature (a partial exception is Risse, 2002). This type of Europeaniza-
tion would not consist of direct references to European actors and themes, but of
increased attention to public debates and mobilization in other member states. In an
intergovernmental polity, the other member states can no longer be treated as foreign
countries whose internal politics are not really relevant for one’s own country. On the
contrary, in an intergovernmental polity, it may matter a great deal who wins the
elections in another member state, or what kind of new policy another member state
develops in a particular policy field. Such tendencies are reinforced by the interdependen-
cies created by common market policies and the freedom of movement within the EU.
Under such conditions, policies in one country may become relevant for one’s own
country in a way that goes far beyond traditional international relations. For instance, if
Germany liberalizes its naturalization policies, this is immediately relevant for other
member states because, once naturalized, immigrants from Germany can freely travel to
and take up work in another EU country. Similarly, the northern EU countries watch
closely what measures states such as Italy, Greece, and Spain undertake to prevent illegal
immigration from Africa and the Middle East, which under the Schengen conditions is no
longer simply ‘their’ problem.
We thus arrive at three theoretically possible forms of Europeanization of public
communication and mobilization:
(1) The emergence of a supranational European public sphere constituted by the
interaction among European-level institutions and collective actors around Eu-
ropean themes, ideally accompanied by (and creating the basis for) the
development of European-wide mass media.
(2) Vertical Europeanization, which consists of communicative linkages between the
national and the European level. There are two basic variants of this patterns, a
bottom-up one in which national actors address European actors and/or make
claims on European issues, and a top-down one, in which European actors inter-
vene in national policies and public debates in the name of European regulations
and common interests.
(3) Horizontal Europeanization, which consists of communicative linkages between
different member states. We may distinguish a weak and a strong variant. In the
weak variant, the media in one country cover debates and contestation in another
member state, but there is no linkage between the countries in the structure of
claim making itself. In the stronger variant, actors from one country explicitly



































































102 RUUD KOOPMANS and JESSICA ERBE
FIGURE 1
Model of intra- and inter-sphere communication from the perspective of national media
from EU member states (here: Germany)
It is important to note that we can speak only of ‘European’, ‘global’, ‘national’, or ‘local’
public spheres in a relative sense. We propose that the spatial reach and boundaries of
public communication can be determined by investigating patterns of communicative
flows and assessing the relative density of public communication within and between
different political spaces. In Figure 1, we have drawn a set of concentric spheres
delimiting different political spaces that are of interest to us in this study. At the centre,
we find the German political space (sphere 1). In the next sphere around it (2) are the
respective national political spaces of the other EU countries.3 In the subsequent sphere
(3), we find the transnational European political space, in which the European institutions
and common policies are situated. Beyond that, the next circle (4) contains all other
countries of the world and their national political spaces. Finally, the outer sphere (5)



































































TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? 103
the G8, the International Court of Justice or the United Nations (UN), as well as
international treaties and conventions.4 The nature of public spheres, now, is constituted
by the density of communicative linkages (symbolized by arrows a–r in Figure 1) within
and between these spaces. In terms of our model, the ideal-typical national public sphere
is characterized by communicative linkages that remain completely confined to one
national political space.
To clarify what we mean by such linkages, and illustrate them with concrete
examples, we must say a little more about the constituent elements of public claim
making. Claims normally consist of the following elements:
• a claim maker or claimant, who makes a demand, proposal, appeal, or criticism;
• an addressee, who is held responsible for implementing the claim, or is the target
of criticism or support;
• an object actor, whose interests are or would be positively (beneficiary) or nega-
tively affected by the claim;
• the issue, i.e. the substantive content of the claim, stating what is to be done (aim)
and why (frame).
An ideal-typical national claim would be a German claimant making demands on a
German addressee in the name of the interests of a German beneficiary, referring to a set
of aims and frames that refer only to the German political space. An example is when
German media report, a call by the German government on the German Trade Union
Federation to co-operate in reform of the (German) retirement system in order to secure
pensions for future (German) generations (corresponding to arrow a). The degree to
which we can speak of a nationally confined public sphere is then measured by the
relative amount of all communicative action that conforms to this ideal-typical national
pattern of claim making. A fully nationalized public sphere would have a density of 100%
of such nationally confined communicative linkages. In a fully denationalized public
sphere the density of purely national communicative linkages would be 0%. This would
not imply that national actors, addressees, interests, and issues no longer play a role, but
that these always appear in combination with some sort of reference to political spaces
beyond the country in question.
Along similar lines, we may speak of the emergence of a supranational European
public sphere to the extent that we find claims that link European claimants to European
addressees in the name of European interests, without referring to any other level of
political space. An example is a motion passed by the European Parliament urging the
Commission to undertake institutional reforms in the context of the enlargement of the
Union (arrow k). Similar to the density scores for nationally confined political communi-
cation, we can conceptualize a supranational European public sphere as the percentage
of all communicative action in which European actors refer to European addressees,
interests, and issues.
This would be the replication of the classical pattern of the national public sphere
at the level of the EU. However, if Europe is indeed a new type of multi-level polity, this
should not be the most frequent type of Europeanized claim. Within the model of vertical
Europeanization, we may distinguish a number of varieties in which vertical communica-
tive linkages between the national and the European political space can be made. In the
bottom-up variant, the simplest form is when national actors directly address European



































































104 RUUD KOOPMANS and JESSICA ERBE
of Justice, or German Foreign Minister Fischer demands that the European Parliament be
strengthened in the next treaty revision), but there are also more complex patterns in
which national actors address national authorities asking them to promote the group’s
interests at European level (a case with national claimant, addressee, as well as object
actor, but an issue with a European scope). The top-down variant of vertical Europeaniza-
tion occurs when European actors address national actors, usually regarding common
European issues and interests (e.g. when the Commission threatens sanctions against
governments that do not meet the criteria of the stability pact).
The weak variant of horizontal Europeanization occurs when German media report
on what happens within the national political spaces of other member states, for instance
that the French national assembly has adopted stricter laws on soliciting in French streets
(arrow f). In terms of the structure of claim making, this case is similar to the purely
German claims, but the difference is that by their coverage the German media transport
these non-German claims into the German public sphere. The degree to which such
coverage represents a form of Europeanization of the German public sphere can be
evaluated only in a relative sense. Horizontal Europeanization may be said to occur if
coverage of other EU member states is over-represented in comparison with that of
non-EU countries. If, on the other hand, references to France and Italy are no more
frequent in the German public sphere than, say, to Japan or Mexico, we may perhaps still
speak of a transnationalization of the German public sphere in a wider sense (if such
references have increased over the course of time relative to purely national coverage)
but not of a more specific Europeanization of public communication.
The stronger variant of horizontal Europeanization is brought about by direct
communicative linkages between two member states’ political spaces (arrow b). Examples
are Prime Minister Tony Blair issuing a statement in support of Gerhard Schröder’s bid for
the Chancellorship, or the German government criticizing the French government’s
handling of the BSE epidemic. As in the case of vertical Europeanization, there may be
cases where all actors involved remain national (German) ones, but the issue is framed in
a comparative way with one or more other member states, for example when the German
opposition criticizes the government’s economic policies, pointing out that Germany
has the worst performance of all EU countries. In such a case, the policies and
performances of other EU countries are deemed relevant as benchmarks or possible
examples for German policies, thereby introducing a European dimension to German
public debate.
Of course, there can also be mixtures of horizontal and vertical Europeanization. A
common example is when government representatives of several member states issue a
common statement on some European issue, for example the proposals of the Spanish,
British, and Italian governments for institutional reform of the EU. Another common
combination of vertical and horizontal dimensions occurs when the media of one country
report on interactions between the EU and another member state, for example when the
German media reported on the FPÖ’s warning that Austria could veto decisions in the
Council of Ministers (arrow h).
All these forms of Europeanization of public communication must not only carve
out a communicative niche in competition with purely national public communication
but also relative to transnational communicative interaction that goes beyond Europe. It
is possible, after all, that a denationalization of public communication and mobilization



































































TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? 105
supranational institutions and regulations with a wider scope than Europe alone (e.g. the
UN), or to national political spaces outside the EU (e.g. to the USA, Russia, or Japan). In
so far as claim making referring to political spaces wider than or outside Europe involves
the EU and its institutions, this would still be a form of Europeanization—of the
supranational variant, to be more precise. Such claims constitute the foreign political
dimension of the EU polity, for example when the EU and the USA criticize each other’s
positions in the GATT negotiations (arrow l), or when the EU General Affairs Council
agrees on embedding the WEU in NATO structures (arrow m).
Another form of communicative interaction involving supranational political spaces
or countries beyond Europe, which might still constitute a form of Europeanization, is
when German media report on interaction between actors from other member states, on
the one hand, and supranational institutions or non-European countries, on the other
(e.g. when they report on Haider visiting Saddam Hussein in Iraq (arrow i), or on French
human rights NGOs calling on the UNHCR to improve the protection of female refugees
(arrow j)). As in the case of coverage about other member states’ internal affairs, the
coverage of such claims in the German media might indicate a growing awareness of the
relevance of other EU countries’ foreign relations to one’s own country’s (or Europe’s)
position in the world. Of course a precondition would again be that such coverage of
other member states’ foreign politics would be over-represented compared with cover-
age of international and supranational politics in which other member states do not play
a role (e.g. relations between the USA and Russia) or in which they appear only as part
of broader international coalitions or members of supranational institutions (e.g. claims
made by the UN Security Council on Iraq).
Finally, there are two types of communicative linkages that are—like the purely
nationally confined claims we began with—clearly competitors to Europeanized political
communication. The first is communications which link Germany to non-European coun-
tries or to supranational institutions, and which bypass the European level. Examples are
the debate about US–German relations in the context of the Iraq conflict (arrow d), or
Chancellor Schröder asking the UN Secretary General to mediate in a conflict (arrow e).
Second, a substantial part of foreign political coverage consists of the internal affairs of
non-European countries (arrow n), relations between such countries (such as President
Bush’s claims on regime change in Iraq or Iran; arrow o), between them and supranational
institutions (e.g. the USA asking NATO for support after 11 September; arrow p), or among
supranational institutions (the UN, for instance, calling on the World Bank to include
poverty reduction in its funding criteria; arrow r). If such forms of political communication
and contestation receive prominent coverage that increases relative to other types of
coverage over time, we may consider them as an indicator of a denationalization or
transnationalization of the German public sphere, but not of a more specific and
delimited form of Europeanized public communication.
To summarize, we can speak of a Europeanized public sphere to the extent that a
substantial—and over time increasing—part of public contestation neither stays con-
fined to one national political space (the European public sphere’s inner boundary) nor
extends beyond Europe without referring to it (the outer boundary of the European
public sphere). Coverage in the German media about other member states’ internal
and foreign affairs constitutes a borderline case and can be interpreted as a form
of Europeanization only if such coverage is over-represented (and over time increasingly



































































106 RUUD KOOPMANS and JESSICA ERBE
Data and Method
In this paper, we draw on one part of the EUROPUB.COM project that maps the acts
of communication through which collective actors make political demands. For the
empirical data collection we use the methodology of political claim analysis (see Koop-
mans & Statham, 1999a), which goes beyond traditional media content analyses. The
latter usually focus on newspaper articles as the unit of analysis, and use article-level
variables to investigate the way in which journalists frame the news. Traditional ap-
proaches to content analysis are media centric, and neglect the role of other political
actors in shaping the nature of public discourse and contestation. Media professionals
certainly contribute to shaping the public sphere, but to do so they have to draw on the
raw material of communicative actions and events that are produced and staged by
non-media actors such as politicians, interest groups, and NGOs. Traditional content
analysis at article level offers no possibility to map fields of political communication in
terms of actors, issues, and the relations between them. At most, traditional methods can
tell us with what frequency certain actors and issues are mentioned, and perhaps to what
extent certain actors and issues co-occur in news stories. But they tell us nothing about
the relations between actors, their role in public debates, or the positions they take with
regard to which issues. It is precisely such information about who addresses who on
which issues and in the name of whose interests that we need in order to answer
questions about the Europeanization of public spheres and the different forms it may
take.
We take individual acts of political communication—claims—as our units of analysis
and use newspapers as a source for the publicly visible part of this claim making.5 For
each instance of claim making, we coded a range of variables, including the actor, the
addressees, the content and spatial framing of the demand, and the object actors whose
interests are at stake. For each actor, addressee, and object actor, we coded the polity
level at which they are organized (local, regional, national, European, and other suprana-
tional), as well as (in the case of local, regional, and national actors) their nationality (for
more detailed information on the coding rules and variables, see the codebook: Koop-
mans, 2002).
Four daily newspapers of different types were selected to represent the German
print media landscape: two quality newspapers with national reach (one centre left, the
Süddeutsche Zeitung, and one centre right, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), the tabloid
Bild-Zeitung, and the East German regional newspaper Leipziger Volkszeitung. From these
newspapers, we coded public claims that referred to one of the following seven policy
fields:
(1) monetary politics: currency politics and interest rate;
(2) agriculture: subsidies, livestock and dairy quotas, animal disease control;
(3) immigration: entry and exit;
(4) troop deployment;
(5) retirement and pension schemes;
(6) primary and secondary education;
(7) European integration.
Given our research question, the inclusion of the topic of European integration requires



































































TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? 107
FIGURE 2
Spatial scope of claim makers, by policy field (N  1051)
variation in the degree and forms of institutional Europeanization. Monetary politics and
agriculture are fields in which the EU has strong competencies of the supranational type.
The next two policy fields—immigration and troop deployment—are much less strongly
institutionalized at the European level. To the extent that European decision making plays
a role in these fields, it is of the intergovernmental type. In retirement and education
politics, finally, the EU has virtually no formal competencies, and European institutions at
most have a co-ordinating task.
For such a broad range of issues that need to be included regardless of whether or
not a reference is made to Europe, it was impossible to code each newspaper for every
day. We therefore used a sampling strategy.6 Since we are still in the process of collecting
the data, in this paper we can draw only on the data for the German case for the year
2000.7
Who Speaks? The Spatial Scope of Actors Involved in Claim Making
The first question we address is whether the actors that appear in the German
media as speakers on the seven selected issues are primarily national, German actors, or
whether they also include a substantial number of speakers at EU level and from other
member states. This will give us a first indication of the level of Europeanization of public
communication in the German news media.
As Figure 2 indicates, on average across the seven policy fields, more than half
(57%) of claim makers in our German media sources are German local, regional, and
especially national actors. The other half has an international dimension and is distributed
between national actors of other EU countries (14%) and of non-EU countries (14%),



































































108 RUUD KOOPMANS and JESSICA ERBE
or international actors (4%). These averages are, however, only of limited interest, because
there is strong variation in the distribution of claim makers across the seven policy fields.
If we start with the two policy fields where the competencies of national institutions
are strongest—education and pension politics—we see that these fields are strongly
dominated by German actors who make up 84% of all claimants in the case of education
politics, and 95% in the case of pensions and retirement. The only other categories
that—at a great distance—receive some level of visibility in the German media are
national actors from other countries. The fact that, among these other countries, EU
member states predominate over non-EU countries is an indication of a certain degree of
horizontal Europeanization, albeit at a very low level. Vertical Europeanization, in the form
of claims by EU-level actors, plays no role whatsoever in these policy fields and neither
do claims by other supranational actors.
More surprisingly, given the fact that there is considerable intergovernmental
activity at the European level in these areas, European-level actors do not play a
significant role as claim makers on immigration and troop deployment, either. The
distribution of claim makers in the field of immigration very much resembles the results
for education and retirement policies. Almost 70% of claim makers on immigration are
German actors, and the remainder are primarily national actors from other countries. In
this case, however, actors from non-EU countries (e.g. Australia) appear more frequently
than those from EU countries, which does not suggest a high degree of horizontal
Europeanization in this field. European-level actors as well as other supranational actors
play virtually no role in public claim making on immigration. The results of Koopmans et
al. (forthcoming; see also Koopmans & Statham, 1999b) regarding claim making on
immigration in the 1990s in five European countries suggest that this finding is not
limited to Germany, but reflects the still strongly national mooring of immigration politics
in European countries in general.
The distribution of claim makers in the field of troop deployment shows a very
different pattern. Here, German actors play a marginal role and are responsible for only
about 15% of all claims. However, neither European-level actors nor national actors from
other member states profit from the weakness of German actors in this field. In contrast,
actors from non-EU countries (most importantly the USA) account for more than half of
all claim makers, followed at a distance, with somewhat more than 20%, by supranational
actors beyond the EU, particularly NATO and the UN. Troop deployment therefore
appears—at least in Germany—as a strongly transnational policy field, but not one in
which the EU or other European actors play any significant role. Our results for the year
2000 thus foreshadow the weakness of Europe in this policy field that became apparent
in the conflict over military intervention against Iraq in 2002/03.
European actors are clearly more important in the two fields where the EU has
substantial supranational prerogatives, namely agriculture and monetary politics. Still,
German actors are the dominant speakers, responsible for almost two-thirds of claims on
agriculture and 45% of those on monetary politics. Compared with the involvement of
German actors, the role of EU actors (15% in agriculture and 20% in monetary politics),
but also that of national actors from other members states (17% in agriculture and 14%
in monetary politics) remains modest. In monetary politics, we also find a substantial
share (16%) of claims that were made by actors from non-European countries, especially
the USA. This attention for claims by US actors is related to the relevance of the exchange



































































TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? 109
Not surprisingly, European-level actors are most prominent in public claim making
on the process of European integration, where they account for 26% of all claim makers.
Nevertheless, national actors dominate this field as well but, notably, actors from other
member states (39%) appear more often as speakers on issues of European integration
than German actors (27%). This seems clear evidence in favour of a truly Europeanized
public sphere as far as the issue of European integration is concerned, and runs counter
to the expectations offered by Gerhards and others, who attribute a bias to the news
media in favour of the national perspective in their coverage of European issues.
The most important conclusion from this section relates to the important differ-
ences we found among the seven policy fields. This result indicates that the question as
it is usually posed in the literature, namely whether ‘a’ Europeanized public sphere exists,
makes little sense at this general level, unconnected to specific issues. For similar reasons,
empirical data about the presence of European-level actors in media content across all
issues have little meaning, since they obscure large differences between policy fields.
Differentiation by policy field is also crucial for the interpretation of findings. The fact that
we hardly find any European-level actors in education and pension politics cannot
reasonably be taken as evidence for a ‘public sphere deficit’. These fields are strongly
dominated by national actors and policies at the institutional level, and the EU has very
little power and influence here. By focusing on the claims of those national actors that are
the most relevant players in these fields, the media actually fulfil their legitimacy,
accountability, responsiveness, and participation functions quite accurately. The same
may be said for the field of troop deployment, where European-level actors do not play
a significant role either, and coverage concentrates on claims made by foreign national
actors, above all the USA, and supranational institutions such as NATO and the UN. Once
again, this seems an accurate reflection of the relevant decision-making actors and
arenas, rather than the result of a media bias against European actors and institutions.
For the other three substantive policy fields, the results in this section provide more
reason for concern about whether the media accurately reflect the role of European
institutions and policies. In the case of immigration politics, one may argue that the low
profile of European-level actors is because most attempts to set up common European
immigration and asylum policies have thus far failed, and the national level has therefore
remained by far the most relevant arena of decision making. In agriculture and monetary
politics, however, there can be little doubt that the European level is where the most
relevant decisions are taken. Still, European-level actors appear almost four times less
often as claim makers on agriculture than German actors. Even in the field of monetary
politics, where the powers of national Central Banks have been almost completely
transferred to the European level, we find more than twice as many German claimants as
European ones. In both fields, moreover, horizontal forms of Europeanization are weakly
developed. Even though in agriculture and monetary politics the member states have
become highly interdependent, the German media tell us little about what other EU
countries do and think in relation to these issues.
A Multi-level Look at the Structure of Public Claims
Although it is very important what kind of speakers appear in the media, an
inspection of claim makers alone is an insufficient basis for drawing conclusions about the



































































110 RUUD KOOPMANS and JESSICA ERBE
TABLE 1
Average multi-level linkages within claims
Type of multi-level linkage All Six policy
seven[Letters refer to the corresponding arrows in fields (excl.
policyFigure 1] Eur.
fields integration)
Non-Europeanized forms of claim making 57% 67%
Purely German national [a] 37% 43%
Relations Germany with non-EU countries or
7%supranational [d, e] 6%
International politics without ref. to EU, DE or
other EU countries [o, p, r] 15% 17%
Europeanized forms of claim making 43% 33%
Supranational Purely supranational European [k] 4%5%
Relations EU with non-EU countries or
5%supranational [l, m] 7%
Vertical 11%Relations Germany with EU (without ref. to 10%
other EU countries) [c]
Relations other EU countries with EU (without ref.
6%10%to Germany) [h]
Mixed vertical/ Relations Germany with other EU countries and
3%horizontal 5%with EU [combination]
Horizontal Relations Germany with other EU countries (without
2%2%ref. to EU) [b]
Relations among and within other EU countries [f, g] 1% 2%
4%Relations other EU countries with non-EU countries 4%
or supranat. [l, j]
Total 100% 100%
Total number of claims (N ) 1051 742
This table presents weighted averages across the seven policy fields, in such a way that each
field contributes equally to the result. The three non-Europeanized patterns and the sum of
Europeanized patterns add up to 100% of all coded claims in the year 2000. Within the
category of Europeanized claims, however, some claims are attributed to more than one
pattern and the total therefore exceeds 100%.
level and from other member states do not play important roles, Europeanization of
public communication may occur when the content of claims refers to policies, institu-
tions, or interests at the European level or in other member states. We will therefore now
broaden the scope of our analysis and look at the multi-level structure of claims in their
entirety, taking into account not only the actors involved but also the substantive aims
and frames that are formulated.
To this end, we return to the types of communicative linkages between different
geopolitical spaces that we outlined in the theoretical section above. For reasons of clarity
we have reduced the 17 possible types of linkages, which were distinguished in Figure 1,
to 11 main categories, which we have grouped in Table 1 according to the theoretical
form of Europeanization they represent. To classify the type of communicative interaction
to which a claim in its entirety belongs, we retain the information on who makes the
claim, but add to this information about the addressees, adversaries, allies, and
beneficiaries of claims, as well as on the spatial framing of the issue. We will focus here



































































TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? 111
analysis the complex question as to how exactly these levels are combined. Concretely,
this means that claims in which German actors address British actors, British actors
address German ones, or German actors frame an issue by drawing a comparison with the
situation in Britain, are all classified in the same way, namely as ‘relations between
Germany and other member states’. For the reader’s reference, Table 1 shows which
categories correspond to which arrows in Figure 1. Average percentages are given for all
seven issues taken together, as well as excluding the field of European integration. In
contrast to the other issues, claims in this field must by definition have a European
dimension, and therefore may bias the overall average in favour of supranational and
vertical forms of Europeanization.
Table 1 shows that even if we take all composite elements of claims into account,
claims that remain entirely within the national German political space remain by far the
most important category, accounting for 37% of claims across all seven fields, and 43%
if we look only at the six substantive policy fields excluding the meta-issue of European
integration. Table 1 shows that claims linking Germany to political spaces beyond
Germany were made most often to European-level actors and policies (11%  5%),
followed to relatively equal shares by references to actors and policies in other member
states (5%  2%) and to non-EU countries or supranational institutions (6%).
More generally, Table 1 shows the predominance of vertical over horizontal forms
of Europeanization. Altogether, 26% of claims (19% excluding the issue of European
integration) link the European to the national level, whereas only 12% (11% excluding
European integration) make horizontal linkages between two or more member states.8
Moreover, most of the horizontal linkages belong to the weak variant in which German
media report about claims by actors in other member states that do not refer to Germany.
As we have argued, such claims can be seen only as a form of Europeanization of public
communication if they are over-represented compared with the foreign news coverage of
the politics of non-EU countries. Table 1 does not suggest that this is the case, as claims
belonging to international politics without any reference to the EU or its member states
are more frequent (15%) than claims about relations between and within other member
states or their foreign relations (5%). A further indication of the relevance of the EU and
its institutions as a focus for claim making is that 12% of all claims (9% excluding
European integration) can be classified as supranational European. This means that these
claims refer either only to European-level actors and policies (‘purely supranational
European’) or to relations between the EU and third countries or supranational institu-
tions.
As in the case of our analysis of claim makers, we must be very careful in drawing
conclusions from these results across all policy fields. As Figure 3 shows, there are again
large differences between the policy fields that make it impossible to draw general
conclusions about the Europeanization of public communication. Generally, the results in
Figure 3 confirm the trends we already saw in our discussion of claimants. If we compare
the percentage of claims with a purely German frame of reference with the percentages
of German claim makers in Figure 2, we see that these are almost identical in the fields
of immigration, troop deployment, education, and pensions. In other words, when
German actors appear as claim makers in these fields, they do so almost exclusively to
present demands and proposals that refer exclusively to the German political context.
This is different in the other three fields where the competencies of the EU are greater.



































































112 RUUD KOOPMANS and JESSICA ERBE
TABLE 2
Claims with a reference to a supranational European actor or issue, as a percentage of all
claims within each policy field
71 2 3 4 5 6
Troop WeightedMonetary European




% 79 45 9 14 1 1003 25
N 183 94 742154 30949 158 104
This table combines the supranational and vertical forms of Europeanization of Table 1.
agriculture, the content of claims remains exclusively German in 42% of the cases. In a
substantial number of cases, therefore, claims by German actors on agriculture refer to
other geopolitical spaces—as Figure 3 makes clear, usually in the form of references to the
EU level or other EU countries. Even so, given the high concentration of regulative power
in the field of agriculture at the European level, the frequency of claims with a purely
German frame of reference (42%) remains high.
Purely national claims are much rarer in the case of monetary politics, where even
before the introduction of the euro we find very few claims (5%) with an exclusively German
frame of reference. Although Figure 2 shows that German actors remain the most frequent
claim makers in this field, their claims almost always referred to contexts beyond Germany.
Such references are made mainly to the European level, where the concentration of
decision-making power in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB) clearly provides
a strong focus for claim making. Less surprisingly, the 27% claims by German actors on
European integration that we encounter in Figure 2 all make reference to the European
level.
Compared with the modest role of European-level claimants in Figure 2 (from 0%
in pension politics to 37% in the field of European integration), Table 2 shows that claims
that refer substantively to the European level are much more widespread. By definition,
100% of claims in the field of European integration refer to the European level (either in
the form of supranationally or vertically Europeanized claims) but, more interestingly, this
is also true for 79% of claims on monetary politics. Thus, with the introduction of a common
currency, monetary politics has very quickly become a field that is debated and contested
almost entirely from a European perspective. This provides support for the idea that the
alleged ‘public sphere deficit’ of the EU is merely a derivative of a lack of strong and clearly
demarcated competencies at the European level. With the ECB, and the relatively
transparent delineation of its prerogatives and those of the Commission in this field, a clear
focus for public communication has been created that has led to the quick establishment
of a strongly Europeanized pattern of public contestation over monetary politics.
This is much less the case in the field of agriculture politics, where only 45% of claims
refer to the EU. Here, we may perhaps speak of a deficit of public communication, since
this relatively low percentage does not seem adequately to reflect the influence of the EU
in this policy field. More detailed analyses of the structure of claims on agricultural issues




































































































































































114 RUUD KOOPMANS and JESSICA ERBE
claims involving only the German national level concern the sub-issue of BSE, where the
opportunity structures are perhaps less clearly Europeanized than is the case for agricul-
tural subsidies. Another possible explanation is that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
is far more intergovernmental than monetary policy. The budget for the CAP is almost
exclusively determined by the member state governments. Moreover, the zero-sum,
redistributive nature of many policies in the context of the CAP might encourage the use
of parochial national frames.9
In the other policy fields, the European level plays a more modest role. In
descending order, the EU level is referred to in 14% of claims on troop deployment, 9%
of those on immigration politics, 3% of those on education, and a mere 1% of claims on
pensions and retirement. The lack of strong supranational or vertical forms of Eu-
ropeanization is in some policy fields partly compensated by significant levels of
horizontally Europeanized claims, which refer to debates and policies on these issues in
other member states. This is the case in the fields of agriculture (18% of all claims),
immigration (14%) and education (11%), where claims referring to other member states
are not negligible. However, they tend to take the form of classic foreign news coverage
of the politics of other countries, and, except for agriculture, do not often refer to linkages
between countries. Moreover, in two of the policy fields (troop deployment and immi-
gration), references to EU member states are less frequent than references to countries or
organizations outside the EU, which implies that we must be careful to interpret these
findings in terms of Europeanization. Such an interpretation is more convincing in relation
to agriculture, pensions, and education politics, where references to EU member states
are clearly more frequent than to countries and institutions outside the EU.
Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a systematic approach to Europeanization of the
public sphere, which distinguishes three forms of Europeanization of public political
communication: (1) supranationally Europeanized communication, where European-level
institutions and collective actors interact around European themes; (2) vertical Eu-
ropeanization through communicative linkages between the national and the European
level, either in the bottom-up variant where national actors address European actors
and/or make claims on European issues, or in the top-down variant, in which European
actors intervene in national policies and public debates in the name of European
regulations and common interests; and (3) horizontal Europeanization through commu-
nicative linkages between different member states, either in a weak variant where media
in one country simply cover debates and contestation in another member state, or in a
strong variant where actors from one country explicitly address actors or policies in
another member state. On the basis of data collected through political claim analysis in
the EUROPUB.COM project, we have analyzed the degree to which these forms of
Europeanization are present or absent in the German mass media in the year 2000.
Our results cannot be read as providing unequivocal evidence either for or against
the existence of ‘a’ European or Europeanized public sphere. The answer depends entirely
on the policy field one studies. Public contestation in the German media around the
meta-issue of European integration quite closely approaches the ideal of a Europeanized
public sphere. Actors at the EU level play a significant role in claim making, and actors



































































TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? 115
As a result, the information about the integration process that German newspaper readers
receive is clearly not limited to a parochial German view on the issue, and provides ample
room for expressions of opinion from European institutions and actors in other member
states.
Given the fact that the data analyzed here refer to the situation only one year after
the introduction of the euro (and still before its materialization as a tangible currency), it
is remarkable how quickly a European frame of reference has come to dominate public
communication on monetary politics. This shows that if significant power is transferred to
the European level and institutional responsibilities are transparently demarcated, the
public discourse in the mass media follows suit. The results on monetary politics suggest
that the most important determinant of patterns of mass media coverage is simply where
the decision-making power in a policy field is concentrated.
Seen from this perspective, it cannot be taken as evidence of a lack of a Eu-
ropeanized public sphere that we find only very few claims with European references in
policy fields such as education, pensions, and troop deployment. Rather than the result
of a general lack of interest of the media in Europe, or of a parochial concentration on
national interests, the modest place given to European actors and issues in these fields
results from the media fulfilling, rather than failing in, their function to provide the
citizenry with an accurate coverage of those actors and issues that matter most.
The two policy fields where there is more reason to have doubts about whether
public debates adequately reflect the influence of European institutions and policies, or
the interdependencies among member states, are the fields of agriculture and immi-
gration politics. Even though the EU does not yet have many powers in immigration
politics, one might have expected more attention to be paid to immigration issues in
other member states and to cross-border issues between Germany and other member
states. As a result of the opening of the internal EU borders in the context of the
Schengen agreement, flows of migration to Germany are no longer independent from
other member states’ immigration policies. Moreover, enlargement will have important
immigration consequences, especially for Germany, which shares long borders with two
of the most important accession countries, namely Poland and the Czech Republic. We
find these strong interdependencies to be only weakly reflected in the kinds of claims
that appear in relation to immigration issues in the German media. Even though the
majority of claims in the agriculture field do refer to the European level, and to a lesser
extent also to other member states, two-fifths of all claims in this field remain within a
purely national frame of reference. Even if some competencies in the field of agricultural
have remained at the national level, our suspicion is that these cannot account for such
a large percentage of claims. Further analyses will have to show whether this suspicion
is correct.
Obviously, for the moment our findings refer only to the German case for the year
2000. Further results from the EUROPUB.COM project will allow us to determine to what
degree our results are typical for Germany, or can be generalized to other member states.
First results already indicate that in at least some member states, especially the UK, the
structure of public communication provides less encouraging signs of the emergence of
(field-specific) Europeanized patterns of claim making than is the case in Germany. In
addition, the upcoming results from the project will allow us to place our findings in a
temporal perspective by way of the inclusion of data for the years 1990, 1995, 2001, and



































































116 RUUD KOOPMANS and JESSICA ERBE
can help us to resolve some of the indeterminacy in the interpretation of the results
presented here. Without a temporal standard of comparison it is not always easy to judge
whether a certain level of Europeanized claim making is high or low. Moreover, a
longitudinal analysis will allow us to trace the consequences of institutional changes on
patterns of public claim making (e.g. pre-euro and post-euro).
NOTES
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Governance and
Democracy—What Prospects, Opportunities and Threats conference, 14–15 November
2002, in Brussels. We thank the conference participants, our colleagues of the ‘Political
Mobilisation and Communication’ Research Group at the WZB, as well as two anony-
mous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
2. This project is sponsored by the European Commission in the context of its 5th
Framework Programme (project number HPSE-CT2001-00046). For an outline, see
Koopmans and Statham (2002), available on the project website at http://europub.wz-
berlin.de
3. For all data presented in this paper, the terms European and EU countries include both
the 15 current members and the 12 countries with whom accession negotiations have
been concluded or opened, as they appear in the public debate as (potential) future
member states.
4. Within each of the national political spaces, one could of course have drawn additional
regional, local, and sectoral political spaces. For the sake of clarity, we have left those
out of the picture and treat these subnational spaces as part of the national political
space. Another simplification in the figure is that in reality political spaces are not
always as well separated as the concentric spheres suggest, but may partially cross-cut
and overlap. For instance, there is more than just one European public space, including,
apart from the EU, subsets of it (e.g. the euro zone), or larger European political spaces
(e.g. signatories to the European Human Rights Convention). Theoretically, of course, it
is possible to disentangle these political spaces, and our data make this possible. For the
purposes of this paper, however, we have chosen to ignore these relatively marginal
deviations and focus on the broader picture.
5. Obviously, many attempts at making public claims never reach the columns of the news
media because they fail to pass the media’s selection filters. For our research question,
however, it is the publicly visible claims that count, since by definition only those that
become public can contribute to a Europeanization of public spheres.
6. For each of the two quality newspapers we sample one issue per week, and for the
tabloid and regional papers one issue every two weeks. These days are chosen in such
a way that for every second day of the year, one newspaper is coded. Because even this
turned out to amount to an unmanageable workload, the sample was further reduced
on half the days to claims with a European scope in at least one of the scope variables
(claimants, addressees, object actors, or issue). For this paper, we only use the days with
the full sample (N  1051).
7. The data were produced by eight coders from two teams, at the University of
Hohenheim (FAZ, Bild) and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (SZ, LVZ). We thank Barbara
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8. These percentages are obtained by summing all vertical forms and adding those from
the mixed category (11%  10%  5%), the same goes for the horizontal categories
(2%  1%  4%  5%).
9. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting these possible explanations
for the differences between the Europeanization of claim making on monetary and
agriculture politics.
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Erfahrungen und europäische Perspektiven’, Swiss Political Science Review, vol. 4,
pp. 225–240.
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